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INTRODUCTION
TOtoIPIP SYMPOSIUM

Thomas F Cotter*
I. INTRODUCTION

This academic year has marked the beginning of the Certificate
Program in Intellectual Property Law at the University of Florida Fredric
G. Levin College of Law, which provides students with the opportunity to
earn a certificate attesting to the fact that they have chosen to concentrate
a portion of their studies in the field of intellectual property law. The job
of putting this program together has taken many years and an enormous
amount of effort on the part of many people, including the current dean,
Jon Mills, and the former dean, Rick Matasar; Professor Emeritus Roy
Hunt; Professors Mark Thurmon, Betty Taylor, Lyrissa Lidsky, Jeff
Harrison, and Stuart Cohn; as well as a large number of outside
benefactors, including Herbert Allen, Scott Draughon, Mary Beth
Fitzgibbons, David Friedland, Scott Lippman, Jeff Lloyd, Leslie Lott,
David Saliwanchik, Mark Stein, Richard Vermut, and Clyde Wilson.
II. WHY DID WE DECIDE TO Do THIS SYMPOSIUM ON THE ToPic OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS?

In choosing a theme for the symposium, there were two topics that,
over the last few years, had struck me as being quite interesting and also
somewhat related. Both have engendered considerable discussion in my
seminar, Intellectual Property Theory, and my course, International
Intellectual Property. The first is the issue of whether nations, particularly
developing ones, may authorize the manufacture or importation of life-

" University of Florida Research Foundation Professor; Director, Intellectual Property
Program, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law.
This symposium is based on a conference that the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin
College of Law held. I would like to thank them for their financial support and the FloridaJournal
of InternationalLaw for agreeing to publish the articles presented. Special thanks, however, must
go to David Saliwanchik and Jeff Lloyd of Saliwanchik, Lloyd, and Saliwanchik, who, through
their generosity, have created the "Saliwanchik, Lloyd, and Saliwanchik Intellectual Property Law
Fund." Their gift has enabled the University of Florida to get the Intellectual Property Program off
the ground, to publicize it, and to fund such things as student internships and the IP Symposium.
So I would like to thank them very much for their generosity.
Finally, I would like to thank our authors, for agreeing to participate in this symposium; I
would like to thank my students over the years, for helping to stimulate my thinking on some of the
issues these articles are about; and I'd like to thank Debra Amirin, Julie Barnes, Susie Grace, Stan
Huguenin, Debbie Kelley, Patrick Shannon, and Christine Williams for their assistance, above and
beyond the call of the duty, in organizing this symposium.
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saving patented inventions, such as AIDS drugs, at below-market prices
without the consent of the patent holders (who, in the case of AIDS drugs,
are usually Western pharmaceutical companies). This is a topic that lately
has been in the news,' and several articles in this symposium will be
addressing it, so I do not want to engage the topic very deeply at this point,
other than to note that it raises some very intriguing problems of law,
economics, and ethics, among other things. On the law side, for example,
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) both permit the compulsory licensing of patents, but only under
certain limited circumstances;2 and they do not address the issue of
whether nations may permit the importation of so-called gray market
goods.' There is also a serious question whether the United States or other

1. See, e.g., Andrew Maykuth, CompaniesChallenge Influx ofGenericAIDSDrugs,PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 7, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, PH File (discussing South African
dispute); Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 26
(discussing Brazil's efforts to provide generic AIDS drugs to all Brazilians with AIDS); Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Africa 'sAIDS War,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at Al (discussing South African dispute);
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, AIDS Groups Revive a Fight,and Themselves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2001,
response to
§ 4, at 4 (discussing South African action filed by pharmaceutical companies in.
legislation that would permit importation of generic AIDS drugs, and recent agreement by Merck
and Bristol-Myers Squibb to sell some drugs there below cost).
Since the date on which the symposium was held, further significant developments have taken
place. See, e.g., Barbara Crosette, US. Drops Case over AIDS Drugs in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2001, at A4 (discussing United States's withdrawal of World Trade Organization complaint
against Brazil, concerning Brazil's domestic working requirements); Geoff Dyer, Brazil Overrides
Aids DrugPatent, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 23, 2001, at 1 (discussing Brazil's threat to begin
compulsory licensing of nelfinavir); Serra Wins AIDS Battle with Roche; Swiss Pharmaceuticals
GiantAgrees to a 40% Price Cut, LATIN AM. REG. RPTS.: Brazil, Sept. 11, 200 1, at 2, availableat
LEXIS, News Library, Curmws File (noting subsequent agreement between Brazil and Swiss
company that owns nelfinavir patent); Rachel L. Swains, Despite Legal Victory, South Africa
Hesitateson AIDS Drugs,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2001, at A4 (discussing drug companies' decision
to withdraw South African lawsuit).
2. See Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, last revised
at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, arts. 5A(2), 5A(4), 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter
Paris Convention]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
J994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, art. 31, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter

TRIPS]. For commentary on the scope of compulsory licensing under TRIPS, see, for example,
Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory
Licenses at InternationalLaw, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243 (1997); J.H. Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standardsof Intellectual PropertyProtectionUnderthe TRIPS Component of the WTO
Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345, 355-57 (1995).
3. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 6 (expressly not addressing "the issue of the exhaustion of

intellectual property rights"); id. art. 28.1 & n.6 (requiring member nations to confer upon patentee
exclusive right to import, but subject to article 6).
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developed nations can lawfully impose unilateral trade sanctions against
countries that refuse to offer broader intellectual property protection than
is required under TRIPS.'
Perhaps more importantly, however, the topic raises many interesting
policy questions, which the articles will address and which touch on a
number of disciplines, including economics, ethics, public health, and so
on. By way of illustration, from an economic standpoint, patent systems
are assumed to increase the incentive to invent; to disclose and share
technical information (which, in the absence of a patent system, might
instead be maintained as a trade secret); to commercialize patented
inventions; and, perhaps, to coordinate the invention of technologies that
follow-up on pioneering inventions.' Thus, the theory is that, in the
absence of a patent incentive, firms would be less willing to invest in the
creation, disclosure, or commercialization of new technologies due to the
ability of competitors to copy those products without having to invest in
the research and development costs that were necessary to their creation.
This may be especially true of pharmaceutical products, which are said to
have very high costs of research and development.' But empirical studies
fail to provide a firm answer to the question of how much of an incentive
is necessary or, more generally, how the benefits of patent protection
compare to the costs. These costs - which may include not only the
administrative costs of having a patent system, but also the costs
traditionally associated with monopoly (higher prices and lower output)
4. For arguments that the imposition ofthese sanctions would be unlawful, see, for example,
Grace P. Nerona, Comment, The Battle Against Software Piracy:Software Copyright Protection
in the Philippines,9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 651, 672-73 (2000); Robert Pechman, Note, Seeking
MultilateralProtectionfor IntellectualProperty: The UnitedStates "TRIPS" over Special 301, 7
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 179, 203 (1998); Nicole Telecki, Note, The Role of Special 301 in the
Development ofInternationalProtectionofIntellectualPropertyRightsAfter the UruguayRound,
14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 187, 220-21 (1996); Wendy S. Vicente, Comment, Questionable Victory for
CoercedArgentine PharmaceuticalPatent Legislation, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 1101, 1111
(1998).
5. For a good summary, see Julie Turner, Comment, The NonmanufacturingPatentOwner:
Toward a Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REv. 179, 186-96 (1998); KEITH MASKUS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000) (presenting evidence
suggesting that strong intellectual property rights regimes may help developing countries to lure
foreign investment); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The PatentPolicy of Developing Countries, 13
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166, 169-77 (1994) (arguing that developing countries benefit from having
patent systems because, inter alia,they facilitate technology transfers from industrialized nations).
6. The empirical evidence on the effect of the patent system suggests that the patent
incentive is of greater importance in the pharmaceutical industry than in most others. See sources
cited in Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking PatentDamages, 10 TEx. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 121 n.397, on file with authors). But see Rosenberg, supra
note 1 (noting arguments that drug manufacturers often receive substantial assistance from the U.S.
government and that they spend more on marketing and administration than on research and
development).
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and the possibility of stifling research into new technologies that build
upon existing technology7 - may be particularly significant when we are
dealing with products such as life-saving drugs.
Of course, one might always fall back upon the argument that patents
actually cost nothing, insofar as they only preclude people from using
inventions that did not exist before and would not exist in the absence of
the patent incentive.8 But this argument assumes that a given invention
would not exist but for the patent incentive, which is difficult to prove,
particularly if there are other incentives to create (such as government
funding of research, fame, or first-mover advantages). 9 More
fundamentally, this argument forces us to consider the Pareto criterion for
evaluating the utility of legal rules. As a general matter, one allocation is
Pareto superior to another if it would make at least one person better off
and no one else worse off than under the other allocation.' ° In one sense,
when a person creates a new invention and refuses to license it to others
or agrees to license it only upon specified conditions, society is no worse
off than it was before, when the invention did not exist. But the decision
to withhold treatment that now exists, even if it did not exist yesterday,
from people who would benefit from it - or, to state it another way, to
allocate the product exclusively on the basis of willingness to pay, which
is in part a function of ability to pay - probably strikes most of us as
morally troubling, whether we ground our ethical decisions in religious
tradition, Kant's categorical imperative, the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, or
other belief." Thus, economics may help us to predict the possible

7. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 6 (manuscript at 71-72).
8. See Steven N.S. Cheung, PropertyRights and Invention, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 5, 6 (1986)
(noting this view in the writings of Bentham, Say, Mill, and J.B. Clark).
9. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 6 (manuscript at 70-71); see also Wendy J. Gordon, A
PropertyRight in Self-Expression: Equality andIndividuality in the Law of Intellectual Property,
102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1568 (1993) (arguing that, in some circumstances, according exclusive rights
to intellectual creations will not leave "enough and as good" for others).
10. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, PiercingParetoSuperiority,39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1,2(1997). More
precise definitions of the Pareto criterion would distinguish between a strong and a weak form. See
Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory ofSocial Welfare: Fairness,Utility,andthe ParetoPrinciple,
I 10 YALE L.J. 173, 176 (2000). For a discussion of whether the Pareto principle itself is superior
to the fairness-based criteria of social utility, see id.; Howard F. Chang, The Possibilityof a Fair
Paretian,110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non-Individualistic
Social Welfare Function Violates the ParetoPrinciple, I AM. L. & ECON. REV. 63 (1999); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Any Non- Welfarist Method of PolicyAssessment Violates the Pareto
Principle, 109 J. POL. ECON. (forthcoming 2001); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairnessv.
Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus the
ParetoPrinciple:On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000).
11. An analogous issue that has arisen of late involves drug trials on human subjects.
Specifically, the issue is whether medical researchers should provide human subject control groups
in developing countries with the same level of treatment they would obtain in the West, or should
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consequences of various legal rules, but the ultimate decision whether
those consequences are good or bad, and therefore whether the rules
should or should not be adopted, must rest upon moral principles to which
economics does not speak.
A second topic relates to indigenous knowledge. Suppose that a
Western researcher learns that the natives of a developing country, or some
portion of a developing country, use a particular plant for certain medicinal
purposes. If the researcher makes a patentable improvement over this
indigenous knowledge, he or she may be entitled to a patent on that
improvement, depending on the circumstances. The question arises
whether this practice itself is ethical and, if so, whether there is any
obligation, either as a matter of law or morality, to share any profit derived
from the patent with the people who made the initial contribution. These
issues have proven to be controversial lately, with the Government of India
in particular taking a negative view of Western companies' attempts to
assert intellectual property rights in derivatives of the Neem tree, 2
turmeric powder,13 and Basmati rice, 4 among others. Again, the concept
of Pareto optimality may suggest that the indigenous peoples at issue are
no worse off than they were before the Western researcher improved and
patented their technology (although this may not always be true, if the
improved version becomes the standard, and, thenceforth, everyone must
pay for the use of it);'" but whether our moral duties extend beyond what
Pareto optimality may require is, again, a question that cannot be answered
by economics alone.
To get back to the question of why we chose to have a conference on
Intellectual Property, Development, and Human Rights, it is because topics
like those discussed above are not only newsworthy but also provide an
instead be allowed to abide by a lesser standard that is, nevertheless, at least as high as the standard
to which these subjects would be exposed absent the trial. See David Rothman, The Shame of
Medical Research, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 30, 2000, availableat http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/ 3907.
Of course, there may be multiple allocations that are Pareto superior to an existing allocation.
In choosing among these allocations, one might be guided by moral considerations, the desire to
maximize aggregate utility or wealth, or other criteria. Moreover, in determining whether a
reallocation is Pareto superior to an existing, baseline allocation, one might wish to consider
whether the baseline itself reflects a just distribution of resources.
12. See Alex Scott, Europe Rejects Grace Fungicide Patent, CHEM. WK., May 31, 2000,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that European Patent Office has rejected
patent claims asserted by W.R. Grace Co. and the U.S. Department of Agriculture for a fungicide
derived from Neem seeds).
13. See Virtual Route to Knowledge, THE Hinu, Feb. 8, 2001, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File (noting Indian government's efforts against assertion of intellectual property
rights in turmeric powder and Basmati rice).
14. See id.
15. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1568.
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excellent illustration of the ways in which economics, philosophy, and
other disciplines may help us to determine what policies to pursue and
which to reject. Although a discussion ofthejustifications for and critiques
of private property may seem about as far-removed from everyday life as
any topic can be, in the present context it is difficult to imagine an issue
with more significant consequences than that of whether a system of
private property rights in inventions improves or impedes the provision of
life-saving drugs. As intellectual property laws expand into new fields and
hitherto undreamed-of technologies, a resort to first principles, informed
by the findings of other disciplines, is a necessary and eminently practical
endeavor.
Before I begin, let me say a little about the articles in this symposium.
Professor Winston Nagan has an article published in this symposium.
Professor Nagan is a Trustee Research Fellow, Professor of Law, and
Affiliate Professor of Anthropology at the University of Florida, as well
as a former chair of Amnesty International USA. He holds degrees from
the University of South Africa, Oxford, Duke, and Yale. Professor Nagan
has authored a very interesting article, titled "International Intellectual
Property, Access
to Health Care, and Human Rights: South Africa v.
'6
States.'
United
Another article to be published in this symposium issue is by Professor
Susan Sell of George Washington University. Professor Sell is a political
scientist who earned her Ph.D. at the University of California-Berkeley.
She has authored a very fine book, titled Power and Ideas: North-South
PoliticsofIntellectual PropertyandAntitrust 7 and is at work on another,
titled PrivatePower,PublicLaw: The Evolution ofthe TRIPSAccord.Her
article is based upon a chapter of her forthcoming book. Her article, which
focuses on the strategies employed by the intellectual property-exporting
industries in the wake of TRIPS, as well as on the strategies of the
industry's opposition with regard to agricultural and plant varieties and
HIV/AIDS drugs, is titled "Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension
Between Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual
Property."

16. Other participants who spoke at the March 2001 symposium were: James Love, Director
of Economic Studies, Director of the Consumer Project on Technology, and Director of the
Taxpayer Assets Project at the Center for the Study of Responsive Law in Washington, D.C.;
Rosemary Coombe, holder of the Canada Research Chair in Law, Communication and Cultural
Studies at York University in Toronto; Jerome H. Reichman, holder of the Bunyan A. Womble
Chair at Duke University School of Law; and Daniel Visser, currently the Hurst Eminent Visiting
Scholar at the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law. I would like to thank Mr.
Love and Professors Coombe, Reichman, and Visser for their excellent contributions to our
program.
17. See SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SoUTH POLMCS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1998).
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Shubha Ghosh, holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of
Michigan and a J.D. from the Stanford Law School. He is currently a
professor of law at the State University of New York at Buffalo, and has
previously taught economics at the University of Texas and law at the
Oklahoma City University and Georgia State University law schools.
Professor Ghosh's article is titled "Pills, Patents, and Power: State
Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit on Patent Rights." Professor Ghosh
will review the creation of gray markets as a response to high
pharmaceutical prices, and will argue in favor of the current South African
policy on economic grounds.
Finally, James Gathii is a native of Kenya and holds an LL.B. from the
University of Nairobi and an LL.M. and S.J.D. from Harvard Law School.
Professor Gathii currently teaches at the Rutgers University Graduate
School of Management, but he will be moving over to the Albany Law
School in the fall of 2001. Professor Gathii's article is titled "Rights,
Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic," in which he considers
strategies for providing AIDS drugs to low-end consumers.
I hope this will prove to be a memorable symposium.
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